This paper studies signaling games under weak conditions, generalizing existing results, and finding new continuity and comparative statics properties.
Introduction
Signaling models have been used to understand a variety of phenomena in economics, biology, and political science. Tractable signaling models satisfy some form of single crossing condition, which allows higher/better types to separate from lower types by choosing a higher signal.
Most theoretical results have assumed strong forms of single crossing, normally
Spence-Mirrlees single crossing (SMSC) . But this often fails in applications when there are intrinsic reasons for taking positive signals. This paper shows that the central results hold under a weaker and more applicable form of single crossing: existence of separating equilibria and a dominant separating equilibrium, and selection of this equilibrium by the D1 refinement. The weaker condition also relaxes differentiability, and even without this we find a unique separating equilibrium under a continuum of types.
Secondly, we find new comparative statics properties and continuity properties of separating equilibria, useful for analysis of signaling that takes place within larger games and in particular supermodular games.
These results are developed in a unified mathematical framework, taking a topological approach to deal with a continuum of types.
Weakening single crossing, with applications

Strong single crossing and (weak) single crossing
Single crossing is key to the structure of signaling games because it gives higher types a greater willingness to choose higher signals than lower types in return for a better response. This is precisely the weak single crossing condition assumed here.
Let θ ∈ Θ ⊆ R denote the signaler's type, a ∈ A ⊆ R the signal chosen, and b ∈ B either a response or an inferred type, in either case partially ordered. u (θ 1 , a 1 , b 1 ) ≤ u (θ 1 , a 2 , b 2 ) and a 1 ≤ a 2 imply u (θ 2 , a 1 , b 1 ) ≤ u (θ 2 , a 2 , b 2 ), and strictness in either inequality implies u (θ 2 , a 1 , b 1 ) < u (θ 2 , a 2 , b 2 ). 1 Most existing theory has assumed a strong single crossing condition, where a higher type is always more willing to choose a higher signal even if it results in a worse response or inference.
Definition.
A function u (θ, a, b) satisfies strong single crossing if when θ 1 < θ 2 : u (θ 1 , a 1 , b 1 ) ≤ u (θ 1 , a 2 , b 2 ) and a 1 ≤ a 2 imply u (θ 2 , a 1 , b 1 ) ≤ u (θ 2 , a 2 , b 2 ), and strictness in either inequality implies u (θ 2 , a 1 , b 1 ) < u (θ 2 , a 2 , b 2 ).
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The difference from the stronger form is requirement in the comparison that Figure 1 illustrates this.
3 Strong single crossing implies that in any perfect
Bayesian equilibrium, choice of signal is weakly increasing in type.
There are two cases in which strong and weak forms are equivalent:
Case 1. u (θ, a, b) is strictly increasing in b and strictly decreasing in a. Then without signaling incentives (under complete information) the minimum signal is always taken. Then u (θ 1 , a 1 , b 1 ) ≤ u (θ 1 , a 2 , b 2 ) and a 1 ≤ a 2 implies b 1 ≤ b 2 , so single crossing implies strong single crossing. 1 This condition is given in Bagwell and Wolinsky (2002) , in the context of a limit pricing model with There are examples within the first case, but it is more common for signals to have some intrinsic value. Outside of these special cases, strong single crossing is typically hard to guarantee in applications. 4 The common and stronger SMSC condition invokes differentiability and asserts that u a /u b is strictly increasing in θ (where A and B are intervals). It implies strong single crossing (Cho and Sobel (1990) ).
Single crossing and supermodularity
Recall the standard definitions of increasing differences and supermodularity.
Definition. f x, y has weakly increasing differences if for x ≥ x and y ≥ y, f x , y + f x, y ≥ f x , y + f x, y . If additionally strictness in the assumptions implies a strict conclusion, f has strictly increasing differences. f x, y, z, ... has weakly/strictly increasing differences in x, y if for any (z, . . . ), x, y → f x, y, z, . . . has weakly/strictly increasing differences. It is weakly/strictly supermodular if it has weakly/strictly increasing differences in all pairs of variables.
An important advantage of single crossing over strong single crossing is that it is implied by supermodularity, as noted in Bagwell and Wolinsky (2002) :
4 I am not aware of any such applications satisfying strong single crossing, despite the benefit of being able to use existing theoretical results.
Fact. If u (θ, a, b) has strictly increasing differences in (θ, a) and weakly increasing differences in (θ, b) then it satisfies single crossing in (θ; a, b).
Supermodularity is a common and effective method for construction of signaling games, and more generally multi-stage games with strategic complements or substitutes, since it can describe these and is closed under addition. A supermodular value function V θ, θ from a second stage, combined with a supermodular payoff w (θ, a) in the first stage results in a supermodular signaling payoff w (θ, a) + δ · V θ, θ .
Examples and applications
Example 1. Consider a signaling model of education. Payoffs for an agent with ability θ from taking education a and being believed to be type θ are U θ, a, θ = − (a − (θ + 5)) 2 + 9θ · θ . Higher types have a higher reward or lower cost of education;
the complete information choice of education is positive, reflecting an intrinsic or job market value 5 ; the benefit of signaling higher θ , which opens up higher-level jobs, is higher for a higher type. U is supermodular, so satisfies weak single crossing.
With two types, 1 and 2 the separating equilibria have type 1 taking the complete information choice 6, and type 2 separating by taking education in 7 − 3 2, 3 ∪ 9, 7 + 3 2 ≈ [2. Maintaining the supermodular structure, we can add additional strategic phenomena between stages, for example a learning by doing or brand loyalty effect of 5 Spence (1973) , the earliest analysis of signaling in economics, assumed that education did not have intrinsic or productive value. 6 Example on request; I am grateful to Henri Savolainen for calculating this. market share. Arbitrary type spaces can also be used without difficulty, and uncertainty in the entrant's cost doesn't affect the analysis.
Currently applications often have to reinvent the wheel by deriving existence of separating equilibrium and applying equilibrium refinements from first principles, in simplified settings, since they are unable to use theoretical results that depend on SMSC.
The result is that applications are typically unable to rely on theoretical results, instead duplicating a subset of results in their specific contexts. In order to do this easily, the models are simplified, with two-type models predominant and strategic interactions limited.
Relaxing technical conditions 1.2.1 Relaxing monotonicity, differentiability, and continuity
Existing theory has assumed differentiability of payoffs (even when SMSC is not used), and often stronger assumptions are used: smooth or C 2 payoffs. If the payoff function is U θ, a, θ , a usual further assumption is ∂U ∂θ > 0. Here differentiability is removed, and U is allowed to have discontinuities in θ . Also, U is only required to be weakly increasing in θ , if we correspondingly weaken the notion of separating equilibrium.
There are two types of applications of these these generalizations. Direct applications, where simply specified games violate the stronger conditions. And topological applications, where the improved closure properties of the signaling space allow finding equilibrium of a game as a fixed point.
Direct applications
Discontinuities and non-strictness of monotonicity in θ can both arise in applications where the response is binary (entry of competitor, agreement to a contract), which leads to a cutoff in θ , with U being discontinuous there and otherwise constant in θ . This also implies non-differentiability.
Non-differentiability can also result from some effect that starts or stops at a certain point. If the response meets a lower or upper bound: for example in Example 2, the entrant's production will typically be 0 up to a certain signaled cost c * . This also causes non-monotonicity when the bound is reached. If the response has multiple "causes", there can be non-differentiable points: a firm advertising and selling to two groups of customers, or a government signaling competence to a market that has regular reasons for responding favorably, but an extra effect of illiquidity takes place at low signals.
Multiple equilibria subsequent to the signaling stage can also generate discontinuity or non-differentiability at the point where one type of equilibrium switches to another.
Topological advantages
Taking limits of signaling games is useful for (at least) two reasons. Firstly in the theoretical development here, taking limits is used to extend results, most commonly from the finite type case to the continuum. Secondly in applications fixed point arguments can be used to show existence of equilibrium: for example to show existence of Markov perfect equilibrium in an infinite horizon, we can use a continuous operator on a compact space of value functions. In taking these limits the L1 norm is used here 7 , and the theoretical development is proof of its appropriateness.
Differentiability, continuity, and strict monotonicity are not closed in L1: a limit of C ∞ payoff functions U i θ, a, θ , strictly monotonic in θ , may be discontinuous and only weakly monotonic. This is a problem when using fixed point theorems that require compact spaces. Also when taking a continuum limit, it is important the limit point should be a valid signaling payoff, which closure guarantees. The relaxed conditions here avoid these issues.
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Relaxing unnecessary conditions displays the essential structure of signaling games more clearly. 7 In our context all the L p norms are identical, for p < ∞. 8 Precisely, useful subspaces are closed. If we restrict to payoffs that are uniformly Lipschitz in θ and a, with a lower bound on the concavity of a (or quasi-concavity, in the manner of Mailath (1987) ) and increasing differences in (θ, a), we get a closed space of signaling payoffs.
Generalized results
Signaling games admit both separating and pooling equilibria, and existing theory and applications have been particularly interested in the separating equilibria. Riley (1979) showed existence of separating equilibrium in the context of a closely related sorting model, assuming SMSC. One equilibrium is dominant in payoffs for the "signaler".
These equilibria exist without differentiability, under just weak single crossing.
Some of the separating equilibria not be increasing, as Example 1 shows, but the dominant equilibrium is increasing.
To cut down on equilibria, theoretical and applied work invokes additional restrictions on beliefs. Cho and Sobel (1990) showed that the D1 refinement selects the dominant separating equilibrium. This assumed finite types, strong single crossing and differentiability. Ramey (1996) showed this for a continuum of types under SMSC. 9 However applied work is often unable to use these results; and often has to apply a refinement manually in simplified two-type settings (usually the "intuitive criterion" of Cho and Kreps (1987) ).
Here we show that the D1 refinement works under the weaker form single crossing.
The natural specification for most signaling applications is a continuum of types, rather than a finite type space. With a continuum of types, Mailath (1987) showed there is a unique separating equilibrium. The argument was that an incentive compatible strategy must be differentiable and satisfy a differential equation. Here we show the result applies in the absence of differentiability.
New results and applications
Continuity properties
In most settings a continuum is the natural specification of the type space, and here a topological approach is used to deal with this. Central to the analysis of a continuum of types are continuity properties about separating and dominant separating equilib-9 Cho and Sobel (1990) and Ramey (1996) extend to multidimensional signals, the latter with a weaker condition from Engers (1987) , but it is hard to have multidimensional conditions that are both tractable and applicable.
ria. (See 3.)
The set of separating equilibria and the dominant separating equilibrium are (upper-semi)continuous in the type space as it becomes dense in a continuum. This extends Mailath (1988) , which found the result for separating equilibria, generalizing it from SMSC to single crossing. 10 The result can be used to extend equilibria for finite type spaces to a continuum: both existence of equilibria and results about equilibria.
Both separating and dominant separating equilibria are also continuous with respect to the payoff function. This result can be used for existence of equilibrium, if this is found with a fixed point argument: for example, it is useful if other players move at the same time as the signaler. (These other players may also be signaling.) It is also used to show uniqueness of separating equilibrium for a continuum of types.
The continuity holds when type space and payoffs are varied simultaneously, which is also useful in existence of equilibrium arguments (see Section 5.3). A condition related to single-crossing is found for the strategy to be increasing in z. This property can give the extended games described above a tractable directional structure.
Comparative statics
The condition is satisfied if the payoff function is supermodular, and then we get a value function which is a supermodular function of z and type. This allows us to embed signaling games within supermodular dynamic games: future supermodular stages generate single crossing in the signaling stage, and this preserves a supermodular value function for previous stages. Roddie (2010a) uses this property to study repeated signaling games. Regularity conditions are also given which bound the rate of increase of strategies and the degree of supermodularity.
10 Manelli (1996) finds that arbitrary equilibria also converge to an equilibrium of the continuum case.
Contents
Section 2 defines the space of signaling games. The necessary topologies are specified in Section 3.
Section 4 defines separating equilibria and characterizes the (closure of the) set of increasing separating equilibria. This set is (upper semi-)continuous in the type space as it becomes dense in an interval and in the payoff function (Proposition 1).
Existence of separating equilibrium is shown (Proposition 3) without requiring differentiability or strong single crossing.
Section 5 studies the payoff-dominant ("Riley") separating equilibrium. This exists uniquely (Proposition 2) and is increasing. Lemma 4 gives further characterization. Section 5.3 extends the continuity results for separating equilibria to the Riley equilibrium (Proposition 3).
Section 6 (Proposition 4) shows uniqueness of separating equilibrium for a continuum of types. This extends Mailath (1987) to non-differentiable settings.
Section 7 studies the comparative statics of the Riley equilibrium. Suppose a signaling payoff is parametrized by z. A condition related to single crossing implies that the Riley equilibrium is increasing in z (Proposition 5). In particular this happens if the signaling payoff is supermodular, and then equilibrium utility is a supermodular function of z and θ (6).
Section 8 shows that the refinement D1 selects the Riley equilibrium, weakening the assumption of strong single crossing in Cho and Sobel (1990 A signaling game is specified in reduced form by a utility function u : Θ× A× Θ → R, for the signaler, giving payoff u θ, a,θ to type θ of the signaler when he chooses signal a and is consequently believed to be typeθ.
To study separating equilibria, we only need to know utility for degenerate posterior beliefs. So we can restrict attention to U : a, θ , where[θ] denotes the probability measure placing probability 1 on θ. We will be using these spaces for most of this paper, but will return to define and analyze the fully specified spaces of u : Θ × A × Θ → R in Section 8, where non-separating equilibria are considered.
Notation. When U is unambiguous, a 1 , θ 1 θ a 2 , θ 2 will mean U θ, a 1 , θ 1 ≤ U θ, a 2 , θ 2 , and similarly for , ∼, ≺ and .
The main signaling payoff space
We define a set Φ of signaling game payoffs satisfying the basic conditions; all payoffs in this paper will be in Φ.
2. weakly increasing in θ , with ((a, θ 1 ) ∼ θ (a, θ 2 )) independent of a 3. strictly quasi-concave in a 4. satisfying single crossing
The first condition is a weakening of the usual assumption of differentiability (or more commonly U ∈ C 2 or C ∞ ). It is weaker than continuity of U , allowing for discontinuities with respect to θ .
The second condition weakens the usual assumption ∂U ∂θ > 0. If U is only weakly increasing, it is possible that some type θ, taking some signal a, does not strictly benefit from being believed to be θ 2 < θ 1 over θ 1 . The condition requires that when this happens does not depend on a. This automatically holds if U is strictly increasing in θ , or if U = α (θ, a)+β θ, θ , a common property of signaling payoffs in a multi-stage game.
11 This means that for any > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that for
12 Of course, adding any function of θ to U doesn't affect it's real properties.
The third condition is relatively standard. It implies existence of a unique optimal strategy under complete information.
The fourth condition asserts the weak form of single crossing defined in the introduction.
Bounded payoffs
An extra condition makes the highest signal sufficiently costly that taking it would contradict IR even for the highest type. This will ensure there are costly enough signals for a separating equilibrium to exist.
Responses
Usually the signaling payoff is derived as u θ, 
Separating payoffs and the complete information strategy
If the signaler of type θ takes a strategy f : Θ → A, and is subsequently known to be type θ, its payoff is:
This will be its payoff in a separating equilibrium described by f . The complete information strategy a * U maximizes this:
Where a * is used U is implicit.
Topologies
We shall be using L1 norms on strategies and signaling payoffs, which requires measures on the initial spaces. On A we use standard Lebesgue measure, normalized to 1.
If Θ is finite, we use counting measure. If it is a continuum, we use Lebesgue measure, but altered to give θ min and θ max positive measure. This ensures that L1 convergence of strategies implies pointwise convergence on {θ min , θ max }. Let µ Θ be this measure on Θ, again normalized to 1.
We also want some notion of convergence in Θ. Let the metric on Θ be as usual, but with θ min and θ max separated from the other points (d (θ min , θ) = θ −θ min +1 when θ = θ min for example).
Signaling payoffs in Φ are measurable functions U : Θ × A × Θ → R, and we endow the space Φ with the L1 norm, using the above measures on Θ and A. Strategies are functions Θ → R, and we will be particularly interested in the weakly increasing functions, Inc (Θ, A). These are measurable. Endow Inc (Θ, A) with the L1 norm; it is then a compact space.
Varying Θ
In order to move between finite types and the continuum, both in showing continuity results and extending results to the continuum case, we need a notion of Θ converging toΘ.
∈Θ is an increasing sequence of sets, with
We want some notion of convergence " f i f ∞ ", despite the fact that they lie in different spaces:
13 Lemma B.4 implies that it is sufficient for this to hold for just one sequence g i . It is equivalent to
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Section 4.1 defines the sets of separating and increasing separating equilibria. For U ∈ Φ B , such equilibria exist. The approach to existence is as follows: Section 4.2 characterizes the closure of the set of separating equilibria, allowing Section 4.3 to find continuity properties, including continuity in the type space. Continuity in the type space allows us to extend a construction (4.4) of separating equilibrium for finite types to a continuum.
Weakly separating strategies
Incentive compatibility is the condition that no type has an incentive to mimic another type. Individual rationality is the condition that no type receives such low utility that he would prefer to take some other action even if the worst possible beliefs result.
If both are satisfied, f is weakly separating (over
S).
14 Definition. Let Sep ± (U ) denote the set weakly separating strategies.
We shall be particularly interested in strategies that are weakly increasing:
If U satisfies strong single crossing, Sep (U ) = Sep ± (U ).
Relationship to Perfect Bayesian equilibria
Call f separating if it is weakly separating and injective. Provided f is measurable, it is then a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, when combined (for example) with beliefs:
14 It is possible to remove the IR requirement. This would streamline the theory in some minor ways.
But IC+IR corresponds to (separating) perfect Bayesian equilibrium as noted below, the most standard notion of equilibrium, whereas IC alone corresponds to something weaker than Nash equilibrium. IC alone corresponds to Nash equilibrium if for any θ, Proof. IC implies a weakly separating function must be injective.
If this does not hold, it is possible for a weakly separating strategy to be noninjective. Pooling is allowed to occur if within a pool no type has a strict incentive to appear to be a higher type within the pool. If all types agree on when it is strictly better to signal θ 2 than θ 1 , then a weakly separating equilibrium with pools is a Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium:
Fact 2. Suppose u θ, a,θ is weakly increasing inθ, and a, θ
1 ∼ θ a, θ 2 is a func- tion of θ 1 , θ 2 ; i.e.
the ranges of θ that do not affect utility are constant in θ.
If
then f describes a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium with U f describing equilibrium utility.
One such equilibrium sets beliefs to [θ min ] for actions that are not taken, and a conditional probability of θ given a for actions that are; such a conditional probability is easy to construct if f ∈ Sep (U ).
The closure of separating strategies
A weakly separating f ∈ Sep (U ) may have discontinuities, if U is discontinuous or has regions of constancy in θ . Then there are weakly increasing functions equal to f except at these discontinuities that are not separating. So we cannot say that Sep (U )
is closed in Inc (Θ, A). But when Sep (U ) is adjusted to include these functions, we get a closed set.
Continuity with respect to Θ and U
In the above Θ has been taken as fixed, but now allow it to vary, with the above functions depending implicitly on Θ. The correspondence Sep is (upper semi-)continuous with respect to U and the type space Θ. We will use a general argument to show this simultaneously. All utility functions will be given on the largest type space Θ ∞ , and restricted as necessary to smaller ones. Parts 2 and 3 are special cases of part 1.
(Continuity in Θ;
extends Mailath (1988) ) Take U ∈ Φ Θ , and let θ min ∈ Θ i Θ .
(Continuity in U :) Suppose
U i ∈ Φ, with U i → U ∞ in L1 and U i θ, a, θ uni- formly continuous in (a, θ) over i , θ . Suppose f i ∈ Sep (U i ) and f i → f . Then f ∈ Sep (U ∞ ).
Existence of separating equilibria
In any separating equilibrium, the lowest type must take the complete information signal a * U (θ min ). For finite Θ, we can define a separating equilibrium χ inductively: subsequent types maximize utility U χ (θ) subject to separating from lower types.
Lemma 2. For finite Θ = {θ 0 , θ 1 , . . .}, if U ∈ Φ, the following definitions are equivalent and uniquely define χ ∈ Sep (U ) if a solution exists. If U ∈ Φ B a solution must exist.
The construction is standard in the setting of strong single crossing (see Cho and Sobel (1990) or Sobel (2009) ) and here we show it works under just single crossing.
Let Φ Sep be the set of signaling payoffs in Φ for which a separating equilibrium exists:
This set contains Φ B , so that Φ B ⊆ Φ Sep ⊆ Φ. So we have existence of separating equilibrium without differentiability or strong single crossing:
Proof. Lemma 2 shows this for finite Θ. For Θ =Θ, take finite Θ i Θ and take a convergent sub-sequence of separating equilibria. Proposition 1.2 shows this is an element of Sep (U ), soSep (U ) must be non-empty.
The dominant separating equilibrium
When a separating equilibrium exists, there exists a dominant separating equilibrium, often known as the Riley equilibrium, which maximizes utility for all types of the signaler.
Existence and uniqueness
Given a finite collection S of weakly separating strategies f , we can take g (θ) for each θ to be the f (θ) that maximizes U f (θ) over f ∈ S. This results in a weakly separating g that dominates all the f . With a little care the argument extends to when S is all the separating equilibria. The dominant equilibrium is weakly increasing, and unique in Sep (U ). It is essentially unique in Sep ± (U ).
(a) g is unique in
Sep (U ). (b) g is (i.) unique in Sep ± (U ) if Θ is finite,
and (ii.) unique up to differences on a countable set if Θ =Θ.
Let R (U ) be this equilibrium:
gives for each U ∈ Φ Sep the above element g .
Further characterization
We can give some additional characterizations and properties of R (U ).
Lemma 4. For U ∈ Φ Sep :
Continuity with respect to Θ and U
In Section 5.3 we obtained continuity results for Sep. The Riley equilibrium is (jointly) continuous in the type space and payoff function:
These results are useful for dealing with a continuum of types. Continuity in Θ is useful for extending results from the finite type case to the continuum. It can also be used to describe equilibria when types are finite but close to a continuum.
Continuity in U will be used to show uniqueness of separating equilibrium when Θ =Θ (Section 6). It can also be used to show existence of equilibria where more than one player is moving in the signaling stage, giving a continuous map from other players' actions to the signaler's strategy.
Simultaneous continuity in Θ and U is stronger than separate continuity, since neither has been shown to be uniform. It can be used in settings with continuous types when more than one player is moving in the signaling stage. It can be used to show that a limit of finite equilibria is an equilibrium for continuous types, giving existence of equilibrium for a continuum of types.
15
6 Incentive compatibility and uniqueness when Θ is a continuum Mailath (1987) Mailath (1987) ) For arbitrary f (θ min ) there exists a uniqueā ≥ a * (θ min )
(extends
15 Suppose the actions of the other players are z, and equilibrium of a game with finite types satisfies an equation of the form
, i affects the type space, and z affects the signaling payoff function, if the Riley equilibrium is involved in F i , simultaneous continuity in Θ and U is needed. 16 This is also true for discontinuous U , as the following informal argument shows: take a separating equilibrium f of U ; at each discontinuity point θ , expand the type space into an interval, so that the sum of the interval lengths is finite, giving a continuous payoff function U . We can extend f to a separating f for U , argue for uniqueness of f as U is continuous, and then get unique f . This would require work to formalize as U does not satisfy single crossing with the required strict inequality, so U ∉ Φ. Note that the assumption f ≥ a * must hold if U is strictly increasing in θ :
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Fact 3. If U θ, a, θ is continuous and strictly increasing in θ , and f is weakly increasing and satisfies IC, then f
The main use of part 1 is the implication of uniqueness of separating equilibrium.
In a standard model with an optimizing respondent who makes a cognitive inference, IR is a reasonable assumption so the initial value condition will hold. Part 2 eliminates IR. It can be used in settings where the respondent is known to play a Nash but not Bayesian perfect equilibrium strategy.
Argument
Adding types imposes additional constraints on separating equilibria, so the set of strategies that are separating over a set S of types is decreasing in S. This is shown graphically in Figure 2 on page 20.
Consider Figure 2 on page 20 with all 3 types active. The Riley equilibrium is ADF.
The incentive compatible functions f starting at A all lie between ADF and AEG. AEG is the Riley equilibrium of the altered game U , where
any incentive compatible f lies between R (U ) and R U .
17 If for example U is independent of θ , then taking any closed set S ⊆ A, the strategy f (θ) = arg max a∈S U (θ, a) satisfies IC. Then f ≥ a * typically does not hold and there is non-uniqueness.
For a continuum of types, suppose f satisfies IC and the initial condition. For
Proposition 3, so we must have f = R (U ). This shows part 2.
To relax the initial condition (part 2), we find that f must jump up toā, and note that the conditions for part 1 are satisfied when we restrict A to [ā, a max ].
Comparative statics
Here we make statements about how Riley equilibrium strategies and payoffs vary with the payoff function.
When is
Since incentives in typical signaling games are directional, we often want to know the direction of movement of one variable with respect to another. So here we ask when one signaling game leads to a higher equilibrium than another. Just as single crossing causes higher types to take higher actions than lower types in the Riley equilibrium, a single crossing relationship between U 1 and U 2 can imply this.
We can decompose single crossing in terms of the property of "having greater preference for higher a and θ ":
, and inequality in (1) or (2) implies inequality in (3).
If the preferences of all types are increased in the sense of ≤ SC , then the Riley equilibrium is weakly increased:
Proposition 5. If U 1 ∈ Φ and U 2 ∈ Φ Sep and U 1 ≤ SC U 2 then U 1 ∈ Φ Sep and R (U 1 ) ≤ R (U 2 ).
Supermodular comparative statics
As explained in the introduction, supermodular payoffs are a valid input of signaling games and a productive way to model signaling applications. Supermodularity can also be an output of signaling games, and this allows for analysis of signaling within larger supermodular dynamic games. This property is used in Roddie (2010a) to study repeated signaling games.
SupposeŨ (z) θ, a, θ is parametrized signaling payoff. The parameter z could be an action played before or simultaneously with the signaler's action. It could also be a state of the world, or capital stock. IfŨ is supermodular, then the resulting payoff v (z, θ) in the Riley equilibrium is supermodular: 
Bounds
Here we give conditions bounding the increase in the Riley equilibrium with the parameter z, and bounding the supermodularity of the resulting value function.
The first result uses natural condition for a best response under complete information to be Lipschitz in z, showing that this still applies with signaling incentives.
The second result requires a notion of bounds on supermodularity.
Definition. Suppose f x, y ∈ R, where x and y lie in R. f has an increasing differences bound of β if for x 1 ≤ x 2 and y 1 ≤ y 2 :
If the increasing differences ofŨ are bounded, then the resulting value function has an increasing difference bound.
18 If f is twice differentiable, this is equivalent to
2. Suppose there exists some U ∈ Φ Θ extending eachŨ (z). Suppose that
an increasing difference bound of β θz + β θ z + α · β za .
These are regularity properties. The first an be used for uniqueness of equilibrium if equilibrium z is a best response to the signaler's strategy. The second result can be used to give Lipschitz conditions in value function iteration in dynamic signaling games, helping to preserve a compact space.
Equilibrium refinement
Equilibrium refinements cut down on the large number of perfect Bayesian equilibria that exist in signaling games. These games admit a multiplicity of pooling equilibria, and for finite types a multiplicity of separating equilibria. Equilibrium refinements work by restricting beliefs off the equilibrium path. They do not fully justify the equilibria they select, but they give a rationale for them by partly modeling outof-equilibrium behavior. 20 They are an extension of the modeling process, and have become a common tool of applied signaling papers.
Payoffs and equilibrium
So far we have been considering reduced utility functions that depend on a revealed type θ ∈ Θ; this is all that is needed to analyze separating equilibria. In order to consider refinements, we need to allow for pooling equilibria -if only to rule them out - and so need specify payoffs on non-degenerate beliefsθ ∈ Θ. We also assume that payoffs result, as they usually do in signaling models, from a response ρ θ , a ∈ R.
Definition. Let Φ * be the set of u :
where:
1. ρ θ , a ∈ R is continuous, weakly increasing in a and strictly increasing inθ 2. v (θ, a, r ) is continuous, strictly increasing in r and satisfies strict single crossing 3. u θ, a,θ is strictly quasi-concave in a
for some a A fully specified payoff u ∈ Φ * gives rise to a signaling payoff U ∈ Φ B with U θ, a, θ continuous 21 and strictly increasing in θ . The reason for requiring a response r , rather than working directly with beliefsθ is that any two responses are comparable, unlike any two beliefs: so different types have identical preferences over responses (they prefer higher ones), but not over beliefs.
Let ψ * ∈ Θ be the initial distribution of types. We assume perfect Bayesian equilibrium:
Definition. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is given by a strategy for the signaler f :
Θ → A and a belief function β : A → Θ with:
4. f (θ) assigns probability 1 to the set of signals a maximizing u θ, a, β (a)
Almost all actions a in the support of f (θ) give type θ the same equilibrium payoff
21 Applying D1 to discontinuous U (for Θ =Θ) may be problematic. In the Riley equilibrium we could have types < θ * taking signals below a 1 , while θ * separates from them by taking a 2 > a 1 ; ascribing a belief compatible with D1 to actions in (a 1 , a 2 ) can then be impossible.
The equilibrium refinement D1
The refinement D1 was originally given in Cho and Kreps (1987) . The following version can apply to finitely many or a continuum of types:
Definition. An equilibrium f , β satisfies D1 if for any a ∈ A and any S ⊂ Θ measurable
Given an action a, if any beliefθ associated with a that would give some type outside S a weak incentive to deviate and play a would give all types in S strict incentives to deviate, then beliefs after observing a must lie in S. Cho and Sobel (1990) showed that under strong single crossing (and differentiability), for a finite set of types, D1 selects the Riley equilibrium uniquely. 22 Ramey (1996) weakened the condition for multidimensional signals from SMSC to the condition given in Engers (1987) ; in 1 dimension this reduces to SMSC. He found the same result for a continuum of types. Here we restrict to a 1-dimensional signal, but weaken the order theoretic notion of single crossing and allow for non-differentiability. 
Suppose that u
The arguments extend those of Cho and Sobel (1990) . Differentiability can be set aside easily as it is not important to the argument of Cho and Sobel (1990) . Relaxing the order theoretic notion of single crossing requires some alterations. If there is a pool of types P taking signal a, under strong single crossing it is possible to separate from it by taking a slightly higher signal, resulting in beliefs at least sup P . This is not true under our single crossing, when the pool is not above the complete information signals a * . A larger move, above a * , must be taken to separate. And downwards separating moves need to be considered in addition to upwards moves, and ruled out. 22 In fact they allowed for payoffs that do not satisfy the bound condition used here, where separating equilibria may not exist: then D1 uniquely selects an equilibrium which has some pooling by the highest types at the highest action.
The notation for a continuum of types is similar to Ramey (1996) , although for a continuum of types the differential methods there are replaced with arguments from uniqueness of separating equilibrium. 
A Key: global definitions
Θ ⊆Θ = [θ min , θ
B.2 Proofs of Facts
These are independent of the main development.
Proof of Fact 2
There is some initial distributionθ 0 over Θ. A measurable f results in a distribution over Θ × A. Let β : A → Θ be a conditional probability.
Let A * be the set of signals a ∈ Im f such that β (a) gives weight to types not taking a. The probability of A * is 0. On this set, using the axiom of choice, let g (a) be some θ with f (θ) = a.
Then β is measurable, and is a conditional probability. It gives a perfect Bayesian equilibrium when combined with f .
Proof of Fact 3
It is immediate that f must be strictly increasing. a * is continuous since U is. So
B.3 Topological lemmas
Both f (θ) where f ∈ Inc (Θ, A), and U θ, a, θ where U ∈ Φ, have common property of being weakly increasing in the final variable, and uniformly continuous in the rest. This gives them similar topological properties.
In the only variable, f ∈ Inc (Θ, A) has continuity points C f . In the final variable, U ∈ Φ has continuity points C (U ):
Equivalently, using uniform continuity of U w.r.t. (θ, a), C (U ) is the set of continuity of U in L1,
Lemma B.1. Both C f and C (U ) are co-countable, have full measure, and are dense.
There are connections between L1 convergence and pointwise convergence. If
We can also allow the inner variable to converge, giving
This property is true for U ∈ Φ also.
Lemma B.2.
If U i ∈ Φ with U i θ, a, θ uniformly continuous in (θ, a) over i , θ , and U i → U := U ∞ , and
If strategies and payoffs converge, then separating equilibrium payoffs converge:
When varying Θ, the following result on the closeness of strategies defined on different Θ will be useful:
Proof. This is trivial for Θ ∞ finite so take Θ ∞ =Θ. {θ min , θ max } ∈ Θ i . Then d f i , g i ≤ δ · |A|, where δ is the width of the largest interval inΘ/Θ i .
B.4 Topological lemmas: proofs
Proof of Lemma B.1
C f is co-countable since discontinuities of an increasing function are countable.
Claim. C (U ) is co-countable:
If U has a discontinuity at θ 0 , a 0 , θ 0 , the function θ → U θ 0 , a 0 , θ must be discontinuous at θ 0 , since U is absolutely continuous in (a, θ) . The function is weakly increasing, so must jump up at θ 0 , with a discontinuity of some δ > 0. Then there exists a ball B of area around (θ 0 , a 0 ) such that
J is weakly increasing, it can have at most countably many discontinuities.
For finite Θ, C f = C (U ) = Θ and all results are trivial. For Θ =Θ, both C f and C (U ) must contain {θ min , θ max }, since {θ min } and {θ max } are open sets. So co-countability implies C f has full measure and is dense.
Proof of Lemma B.2
Both parts of the lemma follow from the more general statement: Take the open cube
Proof of Lemma B.3
Claim. (U i ) f is uniformly continuous in f over i .
For any > 0, take 0 < δ ≤ such that for
So restricting to C (U ), which by Lemma B.1 has full measure, and using dominated convergence (the spaces are bounded a.e.),
B.5 IC implies weakly increasing above a *
Lemma B.5. If f satisfies IC on S and f ≥ a * on S, then f is weakly increasing on S.
Proof.
B.6 Characterization of Sep (U )
For a weakly increasing function to be in Sep (U ), it is enough that is is weakly separating over a dense subset of Θ:
Lemma B.6. The following are equivalent:
2. f ∈ Inc (Θ, A) and is weakly separating over C f
f ∈ Inc (Θ, A) and is weakly separating over a dense subset S of Θ.
Proof. Despite the possibility of discontinuities in U and f , if f is weakly separating over T , the function U f must be uniformly continuous on T , as the supremum of the uniformly continuous collection
Combined with uniform continuity of U in the first argument, this implies uniform continuity of θ, θ → U θ, f θ , θ on T × T .
1 ⇒ 2 Take g ∈ Sep (U ) with g = f a.e.. If f is continuous at θ ∉ {θ min , θ max }, then f (θ) = g (θ): otherwise, since g is weakly increasing f = g on [θ − , θ] or on [θ, θ + ] for some > 0. f = g on {θ min , θ max } because {θ min } and {θ max } have positive measure. So f = g on C f , and so f is weakly separating over C f .
2 ⇒ 3 C f is dense.
and is continuous.
There exists g (θ) satisfying: U g (θ) = U * (θ) and f θ ≤ g (θ) for θ ∈ S, θ ≤ θ and g (θ) ≤ f θ for θ ∈ S, θ ≤ θ . To achieve this, set g = f on S and outside S there is a solution to the above equations lying between the values of S above and below θ. Such values exist because {θ min , θ max } ⊆ S by the metric on Θ.
, θ ≥ U (θ, a, θ min ) on S and so, by continuity of U * and of U in θ, g satisfies IR on Θ.
U θ, g θ , θ is continuous in θ as U θ , g θ , θ is and U is uniformly continuous in the first
, θ holds on S × S it must hold on Θ × Θ by continuity in θ and θ . So g satisfies IC and is weakly separating.
B.7 Proof of Lemma 1 (Sep (U ) closed)
Since Sep (U ) is a subset of the closure of Sep (U ), it is sufficient to show:
Proof. Suppose f i ∈ Sep (U ), and f i → f . Then taking f i ∈ Sep (U ) with f i = f i a.e., we have
for all a, we must have
, θ , and by taking the same limits, this holds for f . So f satisfies IC on C f . By Lemma B.6, f ∈ Sep (U ).
B.8 Proof of Proposition 1 (continuity of Sep)
Parts 2 and 3 follow immediately from part 1:
Proof. If Θ ∞ is finite, eventually Θ i = Θ ∞ . A limit point of separating equilibria must converge pointwise and be separating by continuity of U in a. So assume Θ ∞ =Θ.
Since U i → U in L1, for any θ, a, θ at which U ∞ is continuous, there exists a sequence
Moreover if θ is interior, the sequences θ i can be chosen to be monotonic in either direction. By uniform continuity of U i in (θ, a) we have:
, θ for some increasing and some decreasing monotonic sequence θ i → θ , for
, and by taking limits,
and by taking limits
By Lemma B.6, f ∈ Sep (U ∞ ).
B.9 Proof of Lemma 2 (a finite equilibrium)
Definition 2 implies χ (θ 0 ) = a * (θ 0 ). If 1 uniquely defines a weakly separating equilibrium, that equilibrium must satisfy IC, so must satisfy definition 2, and uniquely since the condition is stricter. So only the claims about definition 1 need to be proved:
Claim. Definition 1 defines a unique χ, weakly increasing, with χ ≥ a * , satisfying IC and IR, when Θ is restricted to {θ 0 , . . . θ i }, for any i .
Proof. This is true for i = 0. Suppose it is true for i − 1 (with i ≥ 1), giving χ on {θ 0 . .
For a solution to exist for χ (θ i ), B i must be non-empty. For U ∈ Φ B , the set B i is guaranteed to be non-empty: it contains a max because (a max , θ i ) θ i −1 U (a, θ min ) for some a by the bound condition,
Using the fact that U (θ i , a, θ i ), strictly quasi-concave in a, B i is a closed finite interval, and definition
So definition 1 gives χ uniquely on {θ 0 , . . . θ i }, weakly increasing, with χ = χ on {θ 0 , . . .
, θ , and by sin-
So χ satisfies IC. χ also satisfies IR:
, contradicting the assumption. So IR is satisfied for θ i .
B.10 Proof of Proposition 2 (Riley equilibrium)
Proof of part 1 (existence)
interval containing a * (θ) and excluding a max . Let g (θ) = max A (θ). Then a * ≤ g , and
Claim. g ∈ Sep ± (U ).
Proof. For each θ, g (θ) is a limit point of actions f (θ) satisfying separating IR for θ, so g satisfies separating IR by continuity of U w.r.t. a. Now take any θ 1 , θ 2 . Take a sequence f n ∈ Sep ± (U ) with U g (θ 2 ) = limU f n (θ 2 ). We have
, θ 2 , the second inequality by IC for f n , and taking
Since g ≥ a * , g is weakly increasing by Lemma B.5. So g ∈ Sep (U ).
Proof of part 2 (uniqueness)
As in the proof of part 1, let
, and
Suppose f ∈ Sep ± (U ) and g are both maximal, so that
. Then on S, h (θ) and g (θ) are distinct and lie strictly on either side of a * (θ). On S, f (θ) = h (θ), and outside
Claim. There is no θ * ∈ S with f (θ) ≤ f (θ * ) for θ < θ * .
Proof. Suppose this were true for θ * .
For some maximal interval (θ
This can be split into two intervals I 1 and I 2 , where I 1 ⊆ S and = I 2 ⊆ S, because g is weakly
This holds also for I 1 . So for θ below
So f (θ) , θ θ a * θ , θ for θ ∈ I 2 . So if f θ is altered to a * θ on I 2 , no lower type wants to mimic a type in I 2 , nor does a type in I 2 want to mimic any lower type. Moreover because there are no signaling incentives within I 2 (which follows from condition 2 of Φ), no type in I 2 wants to mimic another type in I 2 .
Then define α (θ) to be equal to f below θ * * , equal to a * θ on I 2 , and on [θ * , θ max ] equal to a weakly increasing separating equilibrium of [θ * , θ max ] starting at a * (θ * ). By Proposition 3, this exists.
By considerations above, α (θ * ) ∈ Sep ± (U ), and yet U α (θ * ) > U f (θ * ), a contradiction.
Since f is weakly increasing, f (θ) ≤ f (θ * ) for θ < θ * , and f = g by the above argument.
ii. Suppose Θ is an interval. Take θ 1 , θ 3 ∈ S with θ 1 < θ 3 . g (θ 1 ) , θ 1 θ 1 g (θ 3 ) , θ 3 because g ∈ Sep (U ) and the reverse is true for θ 3 , so by continuity of u in θ, we have for some
, θ 1 , we have by single crossing (h (θ 1 ) , θ 1 ) ≺ θ 2 g (θ 1 ) , θ 1 and similarly (h (θ 3 ) , θ 3 ) θ 2 g (θ 3 ) , θ 3 . Putting the inequalities together, we have (h (θ 3 ) , θ 3 ) θ 2 (h (θ 1 ) , θ 1 ). Therefore we must have
, contradicting IC on f . So f must be increasing on S.
Moreover on S, we must have g (θ 1 ) ≤ h (θ 2 ) or else h (θ 2 ) = f (θ 2 ) ∈ h (θ 1 ) , g (θ 1 ) and so θ 1 would want to mimic θ 2 .
Therefore the non-empty open intervals h (θ) , g (θ) over θ ∈ S are disjoint. Therefore S must be countable.
B.11 Proof of Lemma 4 (characterizations of R (U ))
1.
(a) Let f = R (U ). Then f ≥ a * and satisfies IC. Suppose, contrary to the claim, that α ≥ a * satisfies IC, with α (θ
, so β satisfies IR since f does. Since both f and β satisfy IC,
(b) This is immediate from 1.a), since elements of Sep (U ) satisfy IC.
2. Suppose χ differs from R (U ) first at θ * . θ * must have weakly lower utility under χ, but χ (θ * )
uniquely maximizes utility subject to separating from lower types, which R (U ) (θ * ) must also
B.12 Proof of Proposition 3 (continuity of R)
Since R (U ) is dominant, it maximizes any integral of payoffs over types over separating equilibria, and it does so uniquely: equivalence.
. This is weakly positive since the inner term is for all θ, proving the first part. If the integral is 0, then the function U R(U ) −U f must be 0a.e. (α). Claim. Some member r i of i
Proof of part 2 (continuity in Θ)
Proof. For i = ∞ this follows from Lemma B.7, part 2. For i < ∞:
Let r i := R U | Θ i , and let r i (θ) := r i (θ) on Θ i and elsewhere choose r i to maximize U (θ, ·, θ)
So r i is increasing and so r i ∈ i
Suppose
Take a convergent sub-sequence of r i ; by Proposition 1.2 this must converge to an element of
By Lemma B.7, I is uniquely maximized (up to a.e. equality) over Sep (U ) with maximum m ∞ . So r * = R (U ) a.e.. So r i → R (U ) since all convergent sub-sequences converge to this.
Proof of part 3 (continuity in U )
Let r i := R (U i ), so we need to show r i → r ∞ .
For finite Θ this is true by using the finite characterization of the Riley equilibrium. This gives pointwise convergence, which is equivalent to L1 convergence for finite Θ. So assume Θ =Θ.
Restrict to a convergent sub-sequence r i → r * , suppressing sub-sequence notation. By Proposition 1.1, r * ∈ Sep (U ∞ ).
Proof. Define finite approximations Θ i to Θ ∞ := Θ, such that each finite Θ i contains no discontinu-
, θ pointwise with uniform continuity in a. So using the finite
As in the proof of part 2, let r i j 
Proof of part 1 (continuity in U and Θ)
By Lemma B.4, it is enough to show that there exists r i ∈ Inc (Θ ∞ , A) with r i
As in the proof of part 3, let I j f := U j f (θ) dµ (θ), and let r i j
By Proposition converges to I (r * ). So I (r * ) = I (R (U ∞ )), and so r * = R (U ∞ ) and r i → R (U ∞ ).
B.13 Proof of Proposition 4 (IC and uniqueness) Proof of part 1 (uniqueness with initial condition)
f is weakly increasing by Lemma B.5.
f ≥ R (U ) by Lemma 4.1.
is weakly less than
what is needed to separate from θ at f (θ) according to U δ .
Therefore, by single crossing, since f is weakly increasing and
Proof. 1. It follows from the previous claim that:
follows, by splitting the interval up into types at most δ apart.
3. Since U and therefore U δ are continuous, the separating equilibria f and r δ are continuous.
on θ, θ * . By 4. and continuity, f θ = a * U δ θ and so f ≤ r δ at θ. By 2., f ≤ r δ on θ, θ * , a contradiction.
. This is true for allδ, so f = R (U ) on [θ min , θ max ), and by continuity of f onΘ.
Proof of part 2 (uniqueness without initial condition)
On θ > θ min , IC, together with f ≥ a * , imply that f (θ) ≥ā. Lemma B.5 implies that f is weakly increasing on this set. Sof ≥ a and is weakly increasing. Part 1 then implies that U |Ā ∈ Φ Sep Ā andf = R U |Ā .
B.14 Proof of Proposition 5 (a condition for
, θ i +1 . Then:
The second inequality above holds by
So by induction, R (U 1 ) ≤ R (U 2 ).
Proposition 3.2 extends the result to Θ =Θ.
B.15 Proof of Proposition 6 (supermodular comparative statics) Proof of part 1 (strategy increasing in parameter)
Proof. First assume Θ is finite. Take adjacent θ 1 < θ 2 .
Let Z B be the set of z such that θ 2 is weakly bound by separation from θ 1 , and Z U the set of z such that θ 2 is not strictly bound by separation from θ 1 :
, θ 2 , and v (z, θ) has weakly increasing differences in (z, θ) on this set sinceŨ (z) (θ, a, θ 2 ) has weakly increasing differences in (z, θ) and (z, a) and f (z) (θ 2 ) is increasing in x (part 1).
On z ∈ X U , utility for θ 2 is max a w (z, θ 2 , a), where w (z, θ, a) :=Ũ (z) (θ, a, θ) . w is weakly supermodular, sinceŨ (z) θ, a, θ is. So by Topkis (1978) , max a w (z, θ, a) is a weakly supermodular function of (z, θ), and more generally so is max a≥l w (z, θ, a) for any l .
Take z 2 > z 1 in Z U and let l := f (z 1 ) (θ 1 ).
The first inequality holds by weakly increasing differences of max a≥l w (z, θ, a). The second holds
So on {θ 1 , θ 2 } weakly increasing differences holds over Z B and Z U , closed subspaces of Z whose union is Z . Between any two points in z B ∈ Z B , z U ∈ Z U , there is a point in Z B ∩Z U , so weakly increasing differences holds over Z . So weakly increasing differences holds over Θ and Z .
Proposition 3.2 and Lemma B.3 extend the result to Θ =Θ.
Proof of part 3 (value increasing in parameter)
v (z, θ min ) is weakly (strictly) increasing in x: in the Riley equilibrium θ min takes an action a maximizing U (z) (θ min , a, θ min ), and this maximum must be weakly (strictly) increasing in z sinceŨ (z) θ, a,θ is weakly (strictly) increasing in z.
Weak supermodularity of v (part 2) then implies the result.
B.16 Proof of Lemma 5 (bounds on comparative statics)
Proof of 1 (bound on increase in strategy)
Outside this set, the claim holds trivially. Now restrict to Θ .
ThenÛ ∈ Φ Sep A , and:
Proof of part 2 (bound on supermodularity)
Let w (z, θ, a) :=Ũ (z) (θ, a, θ).
Claim. SupposeŨ (z) θ, a, θ is continuous. For any l , w * : (z, θ) → max a≥l w (z, θ, a) has an increasing difference bound of β zθ + β zθ + α · β za .
Proof. First suppose Θ =Θ.
Let a * (z, θ) = arg max a≥l w (z, θ, a). a * is continuous, so a * (z, θ) is uniformly continuous in θ for each z. Since w has an increasing difference bound of δ := β θa + β aθ in (θ, a), for θ < θ :
Also w has an increasing difference bound of β zθ + β zθ in (z, θ). r (a 2 ) ). r (a h ) = r 1 , and r is strictly increasing.
All lower types strictly prefer (a 1 , r 1 ) to (a 2 , r (a 2 )). So all lower types prefer their equilibrium actions to (a 1 , r 1 ) (weakly) to (a 2 , r (a 2 )) (strictly). So for any δ > 0 there exists some some r such that types above θ * − δ strictly prefer a 2 , r to (a 1 , r 1 ), and lower types reverse this preference. In the continuous case, r is found by making type θ * − δ indifferent. Since this is true for some θ * ∈ S for all positive measure S with Sp (a 1 ) x] , where x = sup Sp (a 1 ) , and taking a limit → 0 gives ρ ([x − ] , a 1 ) ≤ r 1 , so by continuity
We now have the result for finite types: in a pool with highest type θ * , take S = θ * ; then
Suppose β (a) is non-degenerate for actions a ∈ A P with positive measure µ A (A P ) > 0. Then for almost all (µ A ) a 1 ∈ A P , β (a 1 ) < sup Sp (a 1 ) . So ρ β (a 1 ) , a 1 < ρ sup Sp (a 1 ) , a 1 ≤ r 1 . This means taking a 1 is not rational for any type, since taking a nearby signal is superior. So a 1 is not taken by any type, contradicting that such a 1 have positive measure.
Therefore β (a) is degenerate for almost all (µ A ) a.
Riley equilibrium
Here we need to apply one of the extra conditions. a) Finite types By induction. Suppose the equilibrium has f (θ) = R (U ) (θ) up to θ i . Letā := R (U ) (θ i +1 ), andr := ρ ([θ i +1 ] ,ā). Since the equilibrium is separating, by the definition of R, type θ i +1
weakly prefers (ā,r ) to his equilibrium action(s). Since R (U ) is separating, θ 1 , ...θ i weakly prefer their equilibrium actions to (ā,r ). So θ i +1 by deviating can achieve a payoff of at least v θ i +1 , a + , ρ [θ i +1 ] , a + , and by continuity in a, must achieve payoff at least the maximum separating payoff v (θ i +1 ,ā,r ), and since the Riley equilibrium is unique and the equilibrium is separating, we must have f (θ i +1 ) = R (U ) (θ i +1 ). 24 Note that a = a 1 is allowed inside the limit. ii. Suppose, on the other hand g (θ) ≥ a * (θ) on a set that is dense in Θ. g is separating on this set.
Then there exists h (θ) with h ≥ a * and g = h on a dense set, with h separating. By Proposition 4.1, g = R (U ). f gives the same payoff as g , so f = R (U ) a.e. by Proposition 2.2.
B.17.2 A strengthening of IR satisfied by the Riley equilibrium
We know that in a Riley equilibrium, no type strictly prefers any (a, θ min ) to equilibrium. This is the IR condition. We can generalize it. Consider the set NIC θ of actions a which if taken by θ would make some θ < θ want to mimic θ , when θ takes the Riley equilibrium action:
Definition. Let NIC θ, θ := a : a, θ θ (R (U ) (θ) , θ) , and NIC θ := θ<θ NIC θ, θ .
With two types, Θ = {θ 0 , θ 1 }, to separate from θ 0 an action a outside NIC (θ 1 ) must be taken. Provided this happens, no type strictly prefers (a, θ 1 ) to equilibrium utility. In general, fixing θ , to separate from types θ < θ an action a outside NIC θ must be taken. Then no type strictly prefers a, θ to equilibrium utility.
Lemma B.8. For any θ , if a ∈ NIC θ , then for any θ * , a, θ θ * (R (U ) (θ * ) , θ * ).
Proof. This is immediate for θ * < θ . For θ * ≥ θ :
Let S := NIC θ . This is open, so A \ S is closed.
i. For θ ≥ θ , on A \ S, U θ , a, θ is maximized at some x ≥ sup S. To see this, suppose it is maximized at x < sup S, and this is strictly better than any x > sup S. Take y ∈ S, y > x. If x, θ θ y, θ , then x, θ θ y, θ for θ < θ and so x ∈ S. So for y ∈ S, y > x, x, θ ≺ θ y, θ , and taking limits as y → sup S, we have x, θ θ sup S, θ , contradicting the assumption. ii. LetΘ := θ ∈ Θ : θ ≥ θ andÂ := sup S, a max .
f is weakly increasing. f satisfies IC onΘ := Θ ∩ θ min , θ andΘ. If θ 1 ∈Θ and θ 2 ∈Θ, θ 1 , f (θ 1 ) θ 1 θ , f θ and θ , f θ θ θ 2 , f (θ 2 ) , so by single crossing θ , f θ θ 1 θ 2 , f (θ 2 ) and so θ 1 , f (θ 1 ) θ 1 θ 2 , f (θ 2 ) . Similarly θ 2 , f (θ 2 ) θ 2 θ 1 , f (θ 1 ) . So f satisfies IC.
Since f is also above a * , by Lemma 4.1, f ≥ R (U ); but f maximizes payoffs subject to weaker conditions, so f = R (U ).
iii. IR for R U |Θ ,Â implies f (θ * ) , θ * θ * a, θ for a ≥ sup S, and so by part i., for all a ∉ S.
B.17.3 Proof of part 2 ( f = R (U ) satisfies D1 for some β)
First we define β. Let S be the set of (θ, a) for which r : v (θ, a, r ) ≥ U f (θ) is non-empty, and S A be the set of a such that (θ, a) ∈ S for some θ. S is closed by continuity of v and U f . On S letr (a, θ) := 
Claim. β f (θ) = [θ] (Bayes' rule)
Proof. By single crossing, and since f is strictly increasing, if θ 0 < θ 1 < θ 2 , θ 0 strictly prefers f (θ 1 ) , ρ (θ 1 ) to f (θ 2 ) , ρ (θ 2 ) , and so strictly prefers U f (θ 0 ) to f (θ 2 ) , ρ (θ 2 ) , sor f (θ 2 ) , θ 0 > ρ (θ 2 ) and the same holds for θ 2 > θ 0 .
Therefore for Θ a continuum, M f (θ) = {θ}. For finite Θ, the above gives {θ i } ⊆ M f (θ i ) ⊆ Let o θ , a := a, ρ θ , a be the outcome of beliefsθ and signal a.
Claim. If a ∈ NIC(θ ), then β (a) is supported on θ min , θ − δ for some δ > 0. 
